The rabassa morta in Catalan viticulture: The rise and decline of a long-term sharecropping contract, 1670s-1920s
成果类型：
Article; Proceedings Paper
署名作者：
Universidad Carlos III de Madrid
刊物名称：
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC HISTORY
ISSN/ISSBN：
0022-0507
DOI：
10.1017/S0022050700022841
发表日期：
1999
页码：
290-315
关键词：
摘要：
For long periods, and in line with recent theoretical literature, the rabassa morta sharecropping contract successfully reduced problems of moral hazard and opportunistic behavior, and provided incentives for sharecroppers to respond to market opportunities. However, from the late nineteenth century, technical change, rising wages, and weak wine prices all increased the incentives for postcontractual opportunistic behavior on the part of the sharecropper, leading to conflicts and loss of trust between the principal and agent. Under these conditions, contemporaries often considered the contract synonymous with exploitation and impoverishment, terms frequently found in the more traditional literature on sharecropping.