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作者：Pendakur, K
作者单位：Simon Fraser University
摘要：In the measurement of inequality, adjustments for differences across households in their demographic composition and in the price regimes they face are usually very simple. Often, nominal expenditure (or income) is adjusted with an expenditure-independent price deflator and a price-independent equivalence scale. I show that using more flexible expenditure-dependent price deflators and price-dependent equivalence scales affects the level of, and trend in, measured family expenditure inequality ...
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作者：Claessens, S; Djankov, S
作者单位：The World Bank
摘要：We document changes in the performance of over 6000 privatized and state-owned manufacturing enterprises in seven Eastern European countries over the initial transition period. We find that privatization is associated with significant increases in sales revenues and labor productivity, and, to a lesser extent, with fewer job losses. The positive effect of privatization is stronger in economic magnitude and statistical significance as the time elapsed since privatization increases. Enterprises ...
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作者：Cigno, A; Pettini, A
作者单位：University of Florence
摘要：The effects and optimal choice of policy instruments directly affecting the welfare of parents and children are examined within the context of a household economics model. If fertility were exogenous, and households differed in number of children only, a first best could be implement through a grant conditional on family size. Outside this very special case, public intervention is either not justifiable on distributional grounds, or involves taxing child-specific commodities less than adult-sp...
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作者：Baland, JM; Robinson, JA
作者单位：University of Namur; University of California System; University of California Berkeley
摘要：We study the implications of the trade-off between child quality and child quantity for the efficiency of the rate of population growth. We show that if quantity and quality are inversely related then, even in the case of full altruism within the family, Population growth is inefficiently high. if the family does not have, or does not choose to use, compensating instruments (for example, bequests or savings are at a corner). In non-altruistic models this trade-off certainly generates a Populat...
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作者：van Dijk, F; Sonnemans, J; van Winden, F
作者单位：University of Amsterdam; Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam
摘要：The formation of social ties is examined in an experimental study of voluntary public good provision. The experimental design consists of three parts. In the first part the value orientation (attitude to a generalized other) is measured. In the second part couples play a multi-period public good game. In the third part the attitudes of subjects to their partners in the public good game is measured. The concept of a social tie is operationalized as the difference between the measurements in the...
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作者：Liski, M
作者单位：Aalto University
摘要：The paper shows that the optimal regulation of stock pollutants can require fluctuating emissions even in the absence of uncertainty. The optimum cannot be implemented by the usual Pigouvian flow tax since it leads to a shutdown problem. A remedy for the problem is to use a linear tax given by a mechanism that effectively taxes average emissions over time. An alternative is to use tax schedules depending on cumulative emissions over a short period of time. A calibration using cost estimates of...
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作者：Haan, M; Kooreman, P
作者单位：University of Groningen
摘要：A wealth of experimental literature studies the effect of repetition and group size on the extent of free riding in the provision of public goods. In this paper, we use data from honor systems for candy bars in 166 firms to test whether such effects can be found outside the laboratory. We find that free riding increases with repetition, and weak evidence that free riding decreases with group size. (C) 2002 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.
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作者：Tangerås, TP
作者单位：Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole
摘要：This paper analyses the incentives for collusion among firms when an industry is regulated by means of yardstick competition. The central assumption is that firms must write collusive side contracts before the revelation of private, correlated information and are unable to communicate later. The analysis shows that collusion is costly to society only if firms can commit to side payments. Third-best, collusion-proof yardstick competition entails more (less) distortion of efficiency for low-prod...
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作者：Conley, JP; Konishi, H
作者单位：University of Illinois System; University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign; Boston College
摘要：Tiebout's basic claim was that when public goods are local, competition between jurisdictions solves the free riding problem in the sense that equilibria exist and are always Pareto efficient. Unfortunately, the literature does not quite support this conjecture. For finite economies, one must choose between notions of Tiebout equilibrium which are Pareto optimal but which may be empty, or which are nonempty but may be inefficient. This paper introduces a new equilibrium notion called migration...
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作者：Maurin, E
作者单位：Institut Polytechnique de Paris; ENSAE Paris
摘要：This paper applies new semi-parametric techniques to estimate the effects of parental income on the probability of being held back in elementary school in France. We use information on grandparents' past socioeconomic status and parents' education level to separate the parental income effects from the effects of the unmeasured determinants of children's performance at school that are correlated with parental income. When considering the probability of being held back in elementary school, we f...
