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作者：Guriev, Sergei; Sonin, Konstantin
作者单位：New Economic School
摘要：In an economy with weak economic and political institutions, the major institutional choices are made strategically by oligarchs and dictators. The conventional wisdom presumes that as rent-seeking is harmful for oligarchs themselves, institutions such as property rights will emerge spontaneously. We explicitly model a dynamic game between the oligarchs and a dictator who can contain rent-seeking. The oligarchs choose either a weak dictator (who can be overthrown by an individual oligarch) or ...
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作者：Ram, Rati
作者单位：Illinois State University
摘要：A body of influential research has suggested that there is a negative association between country size and government size and between country size and openness, and these may account for the positive association between openness and government size. Estimation of several models from 41-year panel data for over 150 countries indicates that while pooled OLS estimates support the foregoing scenario, when cross-country heterogeneity is taken into consideration through the fixed-effects format, th...
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作者：Berlinski, Samuel; Galiani, Sebastian; Gertler, Paul
作者单位：University of London; University College London; Washington University (WUSTL); University of California System; University of California Berkeley
摘要：The theoretical case for universal pre-primary education is strong. However, the empirical foundation is less so. In this paper, we contribute to the empirical case by investigating the effect of a large expansion of universal pre-primary education on subsequent primary school performance in Argentina. We estimate that one year of pre-primary school increases average third grade test scores by 8% of a mean or by 23% of the standard deviation of the distribution of test scores. We also find tha...
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作者：Petrucci, Alberto; Phelps, Edmund S.
作者单位：Luiss Guido Carli University; Columbia University
摘要：This paper analyzes the consequences of lifting from labor some of the burden of taxation in a life-cycle two-sector setup where a consumption good is produced alongside a capital good. The analysis focuses on the implications of alternative ways of financing payroll tax cuts in closed and small-open neoclassical economies. In our models payroll tax cuts do not necessarily stimulate hours worked in the stationary state. We show, for example, that in the closed economy -paradoxically- long-run ...
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作者：Reback, Randall
作者单位：Columbia University
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作者：Gans, Joshua S.; Leigh, Andrew
作者单位：University of Melbourne; Australian National University
摘要：It is well understood that government policies can distort behavior. But what is less often recognized is that the anticipated introduction of a policy can introduce its own distortions. We study one such introduction effect, using evidence from a unique policy change in Australia. in 2004, the Australian government announced that children born on or after July 1, 2004 would receive a $3000 Baby Bonus. Although the policy was only announced seven weeks before its introduction, parents appear t...
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作者：Curry, Philip A.; Klumpp, Tilman
作者单位：Emory University; Simon Fraser University
摘要：We examine the link between the penalties used to punish convicted criminals and judicial prejudice against defendants. In our model, agents choose to commit crimes if their privately observed utility from doing so is high enough. A crime generates noisy evidence, and defendants are convicted when the realized amount of evidence is sufficiently strong to establish the probability of guilt beyond a fixed threshold. We show that if convicted offenders are incarcerated, poorer individuals face a ...
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作者：Ahn, T. K.; Isaac, R. Mark; Salmon, Timothy C.
作者单位：State University System of Florida; Florida State University; Korea University
摘要：When a public good is congestible, individuals wanting to provide the public good face challenges in forming groups of optimal size, selecting the members of the group, and encouraging members to contribute for the public good. We conduct a series of experiments in which subjects form groups using three different entry and exit rules. The experimental results are analyzed in terms of group size, the level of public good provision, social efficiency, congestion and group stability. We find that...
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作者：Schaltegger, Christoph A.; Feld, Lars P.
作者单位：Ruprecht Karls University Heidelberg; University of St Gallen
摘要：The fiscal commons problem is one of the most prominent explanations of excessive spending in political economics. For a panel of the 26 Swiss cantons over the 1980-1998 periods, this paper explores the role of fragmented governments on fiscal policy outcomes. We distinguish between two variants of fragmented governments: cabinet size and coalition size. in addition, we analyze whether constitutional rules for executive and legislature as well as formal fiscal restraints shape the size of gove...
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作者：Lo Sasso, Anthony T.; Lurie, Ithai Z.
作者单位：University of Illinois System; University of Illinois Chicago; University of Illinois Chicago Hospital; University of Illinois System; University of Illinois Chicago; University of Illinois Chicago Hospital; United States Department of the Treasury
摘要：Prior research on adverse selection in health insurance markets has found only mixed evidence for adverse selection in group settings. We examine the impact of state community rating regulations enacted in the 1990s, which greatly limited insurers' ability to risk rate premiums, to determine if adverse selection is more evident in non-group insurance markets. Using data from large, national surveys we find evidence of a shift to a less healthy pool of non-group enrollees as a consequence of co...
