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作者：LIGHT, A; URETA, M
作者单位：Texas A&M University System; Texas A&M University College Station
摘要：Using National Longitudinal Survey data, we estimate proportional hazard models in order to learn whether it is more difficult for employers to identify female nonquitters than male nonquitters. We find that women may be a higher risk than men in the overall sample because they are more likely to be movers for unobserved reasons. When we focus on a relatively recent birth cohort, however, we find that it is no longer difficult to identify female nonquitters. Unobserved heterogeneity becomes an...
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作者：KUHN, P
摘要：Firms' incentives to inform workers about their future viability are analyzed using a two-period signaling model. I find that, if wages can be set after firms learn their viability, they will perfectly signal firms' closure plans. Mandatory-notice laws, if they have any effect at all, reduce worker utility and raise profits because they obviate the need for permanent firms to signal via higher wages. If a noncontingent wage must be set before any private information arrives, pooling occurs in ...
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作者：LABAND, DN; LENTZ, BF
摘要：We argue that lawyers' sons follow in their parents' footsteps because the occupation lends itself to low-cost transfer of relevant skills and knowledge from one generation to the next, especially in the context of the family law practice. Analysis of Project Talent data reveals that knowledge about the law is transmitted from lawyers to their children and that this transmitted knowledge is a significant factor in a son's decision to follow in his father's legal footsteps. Second-generation la...
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作者：VANOURS, J; RIDDER, G
作者单位：University of Groningen
摘要：Little is known about the search strategy that employers use in their efforts to fill job vacancies. In this article, we analyze unique micro data to study this search strategy. We conclude that almost all vacancies are filled from a pool of applicants that is formed shortly after the posting of the vacancy. Hence, vacancy durations should be interpreted as selection periods and not as search periods for applicants.
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作者：LEACH, J
摘要：A two-state model of strikes, in which both the entrepreneur and the worker randomize their behaviour, is developed. The entrepreneur always asks for a wage reduction unaccompanied by a cut in labor services if the state is bad, and he sometimes makes the same request in the good state. The worker sometimes agrees to this request and sometimes threatens to strike. The strike threat is only carried out in the bad state. This equilibrium can Pareto dominate that found in the standard asymmetric ...
