-
作者：Jackson, C. Kirabo
作者单位：Northwestern University; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：Existing studies on single-sex schooling suffer from biases because students who attend single-sex schools differ in unmeasured ways from those who do not. In Trinidad and Tobago, students are assigned to secondary schools based on an algorithm allowing one to address self-selection bias and estimate the causal effect of attending a single-sex school versus a similar coeducational school. While females with strong expressed preferences for single-sex schools have better 10th grade exam perform...
-
作者：Ferreyra, Maria Marta; Liang, Pierre Jinghong
作者单位：Carnegie Mellon University
摘要：We develop a theoretical and computational model of school choice and achievement that embeds information asymmetries in the provision of education. Because school effort is unobservable to households and policymakers, schools have an incentive to under provide effort. This moral hazard affects both public and private schools, although public schools are subject to an additional distortion because of limited competition and fixed funding. Household monitoring of schools can mitigate moral haza...
-
作者：Strand, Jon
作者单位：The World Bank
摘要：Heterogeneity of public utility services is common in developing countries. In a high-level equilibrium, the quality of utility services is high, consumer willingness to pay for services is high, the utility is well funded and staff well paid in order to induce high quality of performance. In a low-level equilibrium the opposite is the case. Which alternative occurs depends on both the quality of utility management, and public perceptions about service quality. If a utility administration has ...
-
作者：Gong, Jiong; Li, Jianpei; McAfee, R. Preston
作者单位：Yahoo! Inc; University of International Business & Economics
摘要：This paper studies procurement contracts where a buyer can either divide full production among multiple suppliers or award the entire production to a single supplier. We examine the effect of using multiple suppliers on investment incentives. In a framework of generalized second-price auctions with pre-auction investment, we show that the optimality of split-award depends on the socially efficient number of firms at the investment stage. When that number is greater than one, sole-sourcing is b...
-
作者：Grauwin, Sebastian; Goffette-Nagot, Florence; Jensen, Pablo
作者单位：Ecole Normale Superieure de Lyon (ENS de LYON); Ecole Normale Superieure de Lyon (ENS de LYON); Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); CNRS - Institute of Physics (INP); Ecole Normale Superieure de Lyon (ENS de LYON); Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); Ecole Normale Superieure de Lyon (ENS de LYON); Universite Claude Bernard Lyon 1; Universite Jean Monnet; Universite Lyon 2; CNRS - Institute for Humanities & Social Sciences (INSHS); Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); CNRS - Institute for Humanities & Social Sciences (INSHS)
摘要：We propose an analytical solution to a Schelling segregation model for a relatively broad range of utility functions. Using evolutionary game theory, we provide existence conditions for a potential function, which characterizes the global configuration of the city and is maximized in the stationary state. We use this potential function to analyze the outcome of the model for three utility functions corresponding to different degrees of preference for mixed neighborhoods: (i) we show that linea...
-
作者：Warren, Patrick L.
作者单位：Clemson University
摘要：This paper analyzes political agency with endogenous information collection and revelation by third-party auditors. While increasing incentives for auditors to provide information straightforwardly improves political control, a small amount of pro-incumbent bias can also be useful for maintaining high levels of control. When the equilibrium level of control is high, most investigations uncover positive information about the incumbent. Since positive information increases reelection rates, mild...
-
作者：Aronsson, Thomas; Cialani, Catia; Lofgren, Karl-Gustaf
作者单位：Umea University
摘要：Following the 1987 report by The World Commission on Environment and Development, the genuine saving has come to play a key role in the context of sustainable development, and the World Bank regularly publishes numbers for genuine saving on a national basis. However, these numbers are typically calculated as if the tax system is non-distortionary. This paper presents an analogue to genuine saving in a second best economy, where the government raises revenue by means of distortionary taxation. ...
-
作者：Fox, Justin; Van Weelden, Richard
作者单位：University of Chicago; Yale University
摘要：We consider whether a career-minded expert would make better decisions if the principal could observe the consequences of the expert's action. The previous literature has found that this transparency of consequence can only improve the efficacy of the expert's decision making. We show, however, that this conclusion is very sensitive to the specified cost structure: if learning the consequences of the expert's action makes the expert more likely to choose the action most likely to correspond to...
-
作者：Traxler, Christian
作者单位：Max Planck Society
摘要：A benchmark result in the political economy of taxation is that majority voting over a linear income tax schedule will result in an inefficiently high tax rate whenever the median voter has a below-average income. The present paper examines the role of tax avoidance for this welfare result. For a right-skewed distribution of taxed income, we show that the political distortion from majority voting is increasing in the median voter's avoidance. Vice versa, keeping the decisive voter's avoidance ...
-
作者：Mialon, Hugo M.; Mialon, Sue H.; Stinchcombe, Maxwell B.
作者单位：Emory University; University of Texas System; University of Texas Austin
摘要：We develop a counterterrorism model to analyze the effects of allowing a government agency to torture suspects when evidence of terrorist involvement is strong. We find that legalizing torture in strong-evidence cases has offsetting effects on agency incentives to counter terrorism by means other than torture. It lowers these incentives because the agency may come to rely on torture to avert attacks. However, it also increases these incentives because other efforts may increase the probability...
