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作者：Gong, Jiong; Li, Jianpei; McAfee, R. Preston
作者单位：Yahoo! Inc; University of International Business & Economics
摘要：This paper studies procurement contracts where a buyer can either divide full production among multiple suppliers or award the entire production to a single supplier. We examine the effect of using multiple suppliers on investment incentives. In a framework of generalized second-price auctions with pre-auction investment, we show that the optimality of split-award depends on the socially efficient number of firms at the investment stage. When that number is greater than one, sole-sourcing is b...
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作者：Grauwin, Sebastian; Goffette-Nagot, Florence; Jensen, Pablo
作者单位：Ecole Normale Superieure de Lyon (ENS de LYON); Ecole Normale Superieure de Lyon (ENS de LYON); Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); CNRS - Institute of Physics (INP); Ecole Normale Superieure de Lyon (ENS de LYON); Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); Ecole Normale Superieure de Lyon (ENS de LYON); Universite Claude Bernard Lyon 1; Universite Jean Monnet; Universite Lyon 2; CNRS - Institute for Humanities & Social Sciences (INSHS); Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); CNRS - Institute for Humanities & Social Sciences (INSHS)
摘要：We propose an analytical solution to a Schelling segregation model for a relatively broad range of utility functions. Using evolutionary game theory, we provide existence conditions for a potential function, which characterizes the global configuration of the city and is maximized in the stationary state. We use this potential function to analyze the outcome of the model for three utility functions corresponding to different degrees of preference for mixed neighborhoods: (i) we show that linea...
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作者：Hoynes, Hilary W.; Luttmer, Erzo F. P.
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Davis; National Bureau of Economic Research; Dartmouth College
摘要：This paper estimates the total value that individuals derive from their state's tax-and-transfer program, and shows how this value varies by income. The paper decomposes this total value into two components: redistributive value, which is due to predictable changes in income (and family circumstances), and insurance value, which occurs when taxes and transfers compensate for unexpected income shocks. Our approach is a forward-looking one, where we examine income and transfers net of taxes over...
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作者：Williams, Roberton C., III
作者单位：University System of Maryland; University of Maryland College Park; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：In recent years, cases in which state governments chose to override federal environmental regulation with tighter regulations of their own have become increasingly common, even for pollutants that have substantial spillovers across states. This paper argues that this change arose at least in part because of a shift in the type of regulation used at the federal level, from command-and-control regulation toward more incentive-based regulation. Under an incentive-based federal regulation, a state...
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作者：Banzhaf, H. Spencer; Chupp, B. Andrew
作者单位：University System of Georgia; Georgia State University; National Bureau of Economic Research; Illinois State University
摘要：The economics of fiscal federalism has identified two book-end departures from first-best provision of a public good. Local governments may respond to local conditions, but ignore inter-jurisdictional spillovers. Alternatively, central governments may internalize spillovers, but impose uniform incentives ignoring local heterogeneity. We provide a simple model that demonstrates that the choice of pricing policy also depends crucially on a third factor, the shape of marginal costs of providing t...
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作者：Glazer, Jacob; McGuire, Thomas G.
作者单位：Harvard University; Tel Aviv University; Boston University
摘要：Changing health insurance coverage for one service may affect use of other insured services. When improving coverage for one service reduces use of another, the savings are referred to as offset effects. For example, costs of better coverage for prescription drugs may be partly offset by reductions in hospital costs. Offset effects have welfare implications but it has not been clear how to value these impacts in design of health insurance. We show that plan-paid - rather than total - spending ...
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作者：Johannesen, Niels
作者单位：University of Copenhagen
摘要：This paper develops a model where firms can shift profits to tax havens by means of intra-firm loans and countries can protect themselves against profit shifting by taxing cross-border interest flows. The model considers two countries with a scope for welfare improving economic integration. The first-best tax system has two important characteristics: (i) the tax rate on interest flows to the other country is zero to ensure the optimal level of economic integration; (ii) the tax rate on interes...
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作者：Cullen, Julie; Gordon, Rafael
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作者：Warren, Patrick L.
作者单位：Clemson University
摘要：This paper analyzes political agency with endogenous information collection and revelation by third-party auditors. While increasing incentives for auditors to provide information straightforwardly improves political control, a small amount of pro-incumbent bias can also be useful for maintaining high levels of control. When the equilibrium level of control is high, most investigations uncover positive information about the incumbent. Since positive information increases reelection rates, mild...
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作者：Boadway, Robin; Tremblay, Jean-Francois
作者单位：Queens University - Canada; University of Ottawa
摘要：The Tiebout model has been the reference point for the classical approach to fiscal federalism. Its emphasis on mobility, benefit taxation, and the advantages of fiscal competition have informed fiscal federalism since the seminal contributions of Musgrave and Oates. This paper reviews the influence that the Tiebout model has had on fiscal federalism, and argues that while its insights remain relevant for local government, it is far from compelling as a positive description of, or a normative ...
