Fiscal federalism and interjurisdictional externalities: New results and an application to US Air pollution

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Banzhaf, H. Spencer; Chupp, B. Andrew
• 署名单位: University System of Georgia; Georgia State University; National Bureau of Economic Research; Illinois State University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0047-2727
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2012.01.001
• 发表日期: 2012
• 页码: 449-464
• 关键词: Fiscal federalism; Environmental federalism; Air pollution

摘要

The economics of fiscal federalism has identified two book-end departures from first-best provision of a public good. Local governments may respond to local conditions, but ignore inter-jurisdictional spillovers. Alternatively, central governments may internalize spillovers, but impose uniform incentives ignoring local heterogeneity. We provide a simple model that demonstrates that the choice of pricing policy also depends crucially on a third factor, the shape of marginal costs of providing the public good. If marginal costs are convex, then marginal abatement cost elasticities will be higher around the local policies. This increases the deadweight loss of those policies relative to the centralized policy, ceteris paribus. If they are concave, then the opposite is true. Using a detailed simulation model of the US electricity sector, we then empirically explore these tradeoffs for US air pollution. We find that US states acting in their own interest lose about 31.5% of the potential first-best benefits, whereas the second-best uniform policy loses only 0.2% of benefits. The centralized policy outperforms the state policy for two reasons. First, inter-state spillovers are simply more important that interstate heterogeneity in this application. Second, because of the convexity of the marginal cost functions, elasticities are much lower over the range relevant to the centralized policy, dampening the distortions. (C) 2012 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.