-
作者：Cole, Harold
作者单位：University of Pennsylvania
-
作者：Curdia, Vasco; Woodford, Michael
作者单位：Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - New York; Columbia University
摘要：We extend a standard New Keynesian model to allow an analysis of unconventional dimensions of policy alongside traditional interest-rate policy. We find that quantitative easing in the strict sense is likely to be ineffective, but that targeted asset purchases by a central bank can instead be effective when financial markets are sufficiently disrupted, and we discuss the conditions under which such interventions increase welfare. We also discuss optimal policy with regard to the payment of int...
-
作者：Meltzer, Allan H.
作者单位：Carnegie Mellon University; American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research
摘要：In the standard policy model, a policymaker optimizes the welfare of a representative agent. In practice, policies are chosen in a political process by agents elected by voters. Drawing on evidence from my two-volume history of the Federal Reserve, the paper reports many examples of decisions influenced by political pressures. The history shows that the meaning of the independence of the Federal Reserve changed over time reflecting political influences. (C) 2010 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserv...
-
作者：Hess, Gregory D.
作者单位：Claremont Colleges; Claremont McKenna College; Claremont Graduate University
-
作者：Dellas, Harris
作者单位：University of Bern; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK
-
作者：Ohanian, Lee E.
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Los Angeles
-
作者：Gertler, Mark; Karadi, Peter
作者单位：New York University
摘要：We develop a quantitative monetary DSGE model with financial intermediaries that face endogenously determined balance sheet constraints. We then use the model to evaluate the effects of the central bank using unconventional monetary policy to combat a simulated financial crisis. We interpret unconventional monetary policy as expanding central bank credit intermediation to offset a disruption of private financial intermediation. Within our framework the central bank is less efficient than priva...
-
作者：Goodfriend, Marvin
作者单位：Carnegie Mellon University; Carnegie Mellon University; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：Central banking is understood in terms of the fiscal features of monetary, credit, and interest on reserves policies. Monetary policy - expanding reserves by buying Treasuries - transfers all revenue from money creation directly to the fiscal authorities. Credit policy - selling Treasuries to fund loans or acquire non-Treasury securities - is debt-financed fiscal policy. Interest on reserves frees monetary policy to fund credit policy independently of interest rate policy. An ambiguous boundar...
