Politics and the Fed
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Meltzer, Allan H.
署名单位：
Carnegie Mellon University; American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research
刊物名称：
JOURNAL OF MONETARY ECONOMICS
ISSN/ISSBN：
0304-3932
DOI：
10.1016/j.jmoneco.2010.09.009
发表日期：
2011
页码：
39-48
关键词：
摘要：
In the standard policy model, a policymaker optimizes the welfare of a representative agent. In practice, policies are chosen in a political process by agents elected by voters. Drawing on evidence from my two-volume history of the Federal Reserve, the paper reports many examples of decisions influenced by political pressures. The history shows that the meaning of the independence of the Federal Reserve changed over time reflecting political influences. (C) 2010 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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