Evolutionary branching and consistency in group cooperation

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Glaubitz, Alina; Fu, Feng
• 署名单位: Dartmouth College; Dartmouth College
• 刊物名称: PROCEEDINGS OF THE NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0027-8424; 1091-6490
• DOI: 10.1073/pnas.2523204123
• 发表日期: 2026-05-26
• 页码: e2523204123
• 关键词: threshold public goods game; evolutionary game theory; Adaptive dynamics; incentives; PRISONERS-DILEMMA; DYNAMICS; PUNISHMENT; carrot; Covid-19; stick

摘要

Understanding the origins of volunteerism and free-riding is crucial in collective action situations where a sufficient number of cooperators is necessary to achieve shared benefits, such as in vaccination campaigns and social change movements. Despite the importance of attaining behavioral consistency for successful collective action, the theoretical mechanisms behind this process remain largely elusive. Here, we address this issue by studying the evolutionary dynamics of individual cooperativity levels in multiround threshold public goods games. By using adaptive dynamics, we explore how individual behavior responses are shaped by incentives, with and without reward or punishment. We demonstrate that rewarding consistent cooperators can lead to the emergence of two distinct populations: volunteers who consistently cooperate and free-riders who consistently defect. In contrast, punishing consistent defectors does not lead to similar evolutionary branching. Our results help offer insights into designing effective interventions that promote collective action and address collective risk dilemmas ranging from climate mitigation to pandemic control.