The Attention-Information Trade-Off

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Serra-Garcia, Marta
• 署名单位: University of California System; University of California San Diego; Leibniz Association; Ifo Institut
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0002-8282; 1944-7981
• DOI: 10.1257/aer.20240850
• 发表日期: 2026-05
• 页码: 1579-1610
• 关键词: social media; COMPETITION; truth; polarization; PSYCHOLOGY; curiosity

摘要

How does information transmission change when it requires attracting the attention of receivers? This paper combines an experiment that varies freelance professionals' incentives to attract attention about scientific findings, with several online experiments that exogenously expose receivers to the content created. Attention incentives lead to significantly less information being transmitted, but not more factually inaccurate content. These incentives increase information demand and the knowledge of interested receivers. However, among the majority of receivers who do not demand more information, attention incentives lower knowledge and increase biases in beliefs, revealing a channel through which misperceptions can arise: missing information. (JEL C91, D83, D91)