Why Is Workplace Sexual Harassment Underreported? The Value of Outside Options amid the Threat

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Dahl, Gordon B.; Knepper, Matthew
• 署名单位: University of California System; University of California San Diego; National Bureau of Economic Research; Leibniz Association; Ifo Institut; Leibniz Association; Ifo Institut; IZA Institute Labor Economics; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK; Amazon.com
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0002-8282; 1944-7981
• DOI: 10.1257/aer.20221703
• 发表日期: 2026-03
• 页码: 897-933
• 关键词: unemployment-insurance benefits; job search; duration; spells; CONSEQUENCES; recessions; IMPACT

摘要

Why is workplace sexual harassment chronically underreported? We hypothesize that employers coerce victims into silence through the threat of a retaliatory firing. To test this, we estimate how two external shocks that reduce workers'outside options - unemployment rate increases and sharp cuts to unemployment insurance benefits - affect the selectivity of sexual harassment charges filed with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. We find that both shocks increase selectivity, which implies an increase in underreporting. Bolstering these findings, anonymous Google searches for sexual harassment in the workplace (total prevalence) spike relative to charges filed (reported prevalence) during the Great Recession. (JEL J71, J78)