Sequential Cursed Equilibrium

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Cohen, Shani; Li, Shengwu
• 署名单位: Hebrew University of Jerusalem; Harvard University
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0002-8282; 1944-7981
• DOI: 10.1257/aer.20230309
• 发表日期: 2026-03
• 页码: 934-976
• 关键词: HYPOTHETICAL THINKING; INFORMATION; auctions; failures; games

摘要

We propose an extensive-form solution concept, with players who neglect information from hypothetical events but make inferences from observed events. Our concept modifies cursed equilibrium (Eyster and Rabin 2005) and allows that players can be cursed about endogenous information. (JEL C73, D44, D71, D81, D83, D91)