Blockchain congestion facilitates currency competition

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Guennewig, Maxi
• 署名单位: European Central Bank
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2026.106162
• 发表日期: 2026
• 关键词: equilibrium; POLICY

摘要

Blockchain capacity constraints induce congestion when many users want to transact at the same time. This paper argues that blockchain capacity constraints, coupled with the need to incentivize miners to maintain blockchain security, lead to low inflation outcomes when cryptocurrencies compete for user demand. If two coins are both used as medium of exchange, a low-inflation coin must experience higher congestion than a high-inflation coin; otherwise demand for the latter is zero. Lowering coin growth rates then boosts transaction demand, limiting the equilibrium inflation rate. However, some gains from trade are not realized due to congestion and the cost of blockchain security. The paper also identifies anti-competitive dynamics in Proof-of-Stake: while higher coin growth reduces transaction-based demand, it may increase demand from validators even more.