Tariffs and goods-market search frictions*,**

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Krolikowski, Pawel M.; McCallum, Andrew H.
• 署名单位: Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Cleveland; Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve System Board of Governors
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-1996
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jinteco.2026.104266
• 发表日期: 2026
• 关键词: matching model; welfare loss; TRADE THEORY; EFFICIENCY; wars; unemployment; Retaliation; FRAMEWORK; frictions; POLICY

摘要

We study tariffs in a general equilibrium dynamic model with search frictions between heterogeneous exporting producers and importing retailers. We show the model has a unique equilibrium and analytically characterize home unilateral import tariffs that maximize welfare given a passive foreign country. Search frictions add two terms to the standard optimal tariff expression: One lowers tariffs when contact rates are low; another when private export costs exceed social opportunity costs. Search frictions also introduce new incentives to subsidize imports due to market thickness effects. We calibrate our baseline to U.S. and Chinese 2016 data. We compare this baseline to a counterfactual with international search costs reduced to domestic levels but with all other parameters fixed. We find that higher baseline search costs reduce optimal U.S. unilateral and Nash tariffs and attenuate welfare responses to tariff changes.