length Unilateral environmental policy and offshoring

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Bolz, Simon J.; Naumann, Fabrice; Richter, Philipp M.
• 署名单位: University of Munich; University of Mannheim; University of Wurzburg; Leibniz Association; Ifo Institut; Leibniz Association; DIW Berlin - Deutsches Institut fur Wirtschaftsforschung
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-1996
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jinteco.2025.104185
• 发表日期: 2026
• 关键词: INTERNATIONAL-TRADE; INTRAINDUSTRY REALLOCATIONS; carbon leakage; emissions; PRODUCTIVITY; tasks; FIRMS; Heterogeneity; TECHNOLOGY; pollution

摘要

This paper examines how offshoring shapes emissions leakage and global emissions in response to unilateral environmental policy. We use a general equilibrium offshoring model with heterogeneous firms, based on standard modeling assumptions, where firms allocate labor between production tasks and emissions abatement. We find that global emissions respond non-monotonically to a unilateral emissions tax increase: for small cross-country tax differentials, emissions fall; but as the difference widens, leakage exceeds 100%, raising global emissions due to a global technique effect. The cleanest domestic firms start offshoring and incumbent offshoring firms become dirtier under declining effective foreign taxes. We isolate the offshoring margin-one underexplored channel of leakage-and contrast our findings with comparable models of trade in final goods: the mode of globalization matters. Complementing the unilateral reform with a border carbon adjustment (BCA) prevents emissions leakage but may raise inequality between countries.