Does Monitoring Change Teacher Pedagogy and Student Outcomes?

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Phipps, Aaron
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF LABOR ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0734-306X
• DOI: 10.1086/733494
• 发表日期: 2026
• 关键词: incentive contracts; performance pay; merit pay; determinants; PRODUCTIVITY; motivation; pressure; impacts

摘要

In theory, monitoring can improve employee motivation and effort,particularly in settings lacking measurable outputs, but research as-sessing monitoring as a motivator is limited to laboratory settings.To address this gap, I leverage exogenous variation in the presenceand intensity of teacher monitoring, in the form of unannounced in-class observations as part of DC public schools'IMPACT program.As monitoring intensifies, teachers use more individualized teachingand emphasize higher-level learning. When teachers are unmonitored,their students have lower test scores and increased suspensions. Thisevidence validates monitoring as a potential tool for enhancing teacherpedagogy and employee performance more broadly.