Strategic Wage Posting, Market Power, and Mismatch

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Jungbauer, Thomas
• 署名单位: Cornell University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF LABOR ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0734-306X
• DOI: 10.1086/733046
• 发表日期: 2026
• 关键词: Directed search; LABOR; monopsony; match; FIRMS; COMPETITION; EFFICIENCY; workers; Salary; MODEL

摘要

This paper analyzes the effects of firms posting multiple but varying numbers of vacancies, hence differing in their market power, in professional labor markets. I find that strategic wage posting does, in general, not result in an efficient assignment of workers to firms. This is because firms with a larger number of vacancies pay on average lower wages than their competitors due to a lack of within-firm rivalry. If highly productive firms hire more, the resulting welfare loss due to mismatch may be substantial. Moreover, I provide a potential explanation why firms post uniform wages, missing out on more skilled workers.