Disagreement about Monetary Policy

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Sastry, Karthik A.
• 署名单位: Princeton University
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-MACROECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1945-7707
• DOI: 10.1257/mac.20220266
• 发表日期: 2026
• 关键词: social value; macroeconomic expectations; federal-reserve; INFORMATION; DISCRETION; inflation; surprises; returns

摘要

This paper studies why central banks and markets hold different beliefs. I introduce a model that formalizes three mechanisms for disagreement: asymmetric information about fundamentals, different perceptions of the policy rule, and different confidence in public signals. I show how to separately identify these mechanisms using their predictions for beliefs about multiple variables. In US data, negative macroeconomic news predicts market overestimation of interest rates and employment relative to realizations and Federal Reserve forecasts. The estimates imply that markets slightly misspecify the monetary rule and are significantly underconfident in public information. Central bank private information and information effects are quantitatively negligible. (JEL D82, D83, E24, E43, E52, E58)