From Immediate Acceptance to Deferred Acceptance: Effects on School Admissions and Achievement in England

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Terrier, Camille; Pathak, Parag A.; Ren, Kevin
• 署名单位: University of London; Queen Mary University London; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); National Bureau of Economic Research; Northwestern University
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-APPLIED ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1945-7782
• DOI: 10.1257/app.20230056
• 发表日期: 2026
• 关键词: Chinese college admissions; mechanism design; boston mechanism; CHOICE REFORMS; preferences; performance; INFORMATION; teachers; interim; RACE

摘要

Countries and cities around the world increasingly rely on centralized systems for student placement. Two algorithms, deferred acceptance (DA) and immediate acceptance (IA), are widespread. We investigate the effects of the national ban of IA in England. Before the ban, 49 local authorities used DA and 16 used IA; all switched to DA afterward. We find that the elimination of IA reduces measures of school quality for low-SES students more than high-SES students. This effect is primarily driven by a decrease in low-SES admissions at selective schools. Our findings point to an unintended consequence of the IA to DA transition. (JEL D82, H52, H75, I21, I28)