Wealth, Marriage, and Sex Selection

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Borker, Girija; Eeckhout, Jan; Luke, Nancy; Mini, Shantidani; Munshi, Kaivan; Swaminathan, Soumya
• 署名单位: The World Bank; IZA Institute Labor Economics; Pompeu Fabra University; Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); Pennsylvania State University; Pennsylvania State University - University Park; Christian Medical College & Hospital (CMCH) Vellore; Yale University; Communaute d'universites et etablissements de Toulouse (Comue); Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Toulouse School of Economics
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-APPLIED ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1945-7782
• DOI: 10.1257/app.20220361
• 发表日期: 2026
• 关键词: Son preference; FEMALE INFANTICIDE; fertility decline; gender bias; dowry; INDIA; MARKET; AGE; mortality; ECONOMICS

摘要

Two mechanisms have been proposed to explain sex selection in India: son preference, in which parents desire a male heir, and daughter aversion, in which dowry payments make parents worse off with girls. Our model incorporates both mechanisms, providing microfoundations, based on the organization of the marriage institution, for daughter aversion. Marital matching, sex selection, and dowries are jointly determined in the model, whose implications are tested on a representative sample of rural households. Simulations of the model indicate that existing policies targeting daughter aversion might exacerbate the problem, while identifying other policies that could be effective.