From Doubt to Devotion: Trials and Learning-Based Pricing

• 成果类型: Article; Early Access
• 署名作者: Gan, Tan; Wu, Nicholas
• 署名单位: University of London; London School Economics & Political Science; Yale University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-3808
• DOI: 10.1086/742434
• 发表日期: 2026
• 关键词: Mechanism design; equilibrium; ECONOMICS; QUALITY; signal

摘要

An informed seller designs a dynamic mechanism to sell an experience good. The seller has private information about product match, which affects the buyer's private consumption experience. The belief gap between both parties coupled with the buyer's learning yields mechanisms providing the skeptical buyer with limited access to the product and an option to upgrade if the buyer is swayed by a good experience. Depending on the seller's screening technology, this takes the form of free/discounted trials or dynamic tiered pricing, which are prevalent in digital markets. Unlike static environments, having consumer data can reduce sellers' revenue in equilibrium.