Optimal Queue Design

• 成果类型: Article; Early Access
• 署名作者: Che, Yeon-Koo; Tercieux, Olivier
• 署名单位: Columbia University; Paris School of Economics; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-3808
• DOI: 10.1086/741622
• 发表日期: 2026
• 关键词: information; times

摘要

We study optimal service allocation through queues when agents have homogeneous preferences and must be incentivized to enter and remain in the queue. The designer controls entry, exit, service priority, and information about queue priorities. Under a mild regularity condition, the optimal mechanism admits agents only up to a cutoff queue length, never removes admitted agents, serves them according to a first-come, first-served (FCFS) rule, and provides no information beyond recommendations. FCFS is also necessary for optimality in a rich domain. The result identifies a new role for queue disciplines in regulating agents' beliefs and dynamic incentives, and uncovers a hitherto unrecognized virtue of FCFS in this regard.