Private Private Information

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: He, Kevin; Sandomirskiy, Fedor; Tamuz, Omer
• 署名单位: University of Pennsylvania; Princeton University; California Institute of Technology
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-3808
• DOI: 10.1086/739833
• 发表日期: 2026
• 关键词: reduced-form auctions; implementation; equilibrium; probability; EQUIVALENCE; uniqueness; sets

摘要

Private signals model noisy information about an unknown state. Although these signals are called private, they may still carry information about each other. Our paper introduces the concept of private private signals, which contain information about the state but not about other signals. To achieve privacy, signal quality may need to be sacrificed. We study the informativeness of private private signals and characterize those that are optimal in the sense that they cannot be made more informative without violating privacy. We discuss implications for privacy in recommendation systems, information design, causal inference, and mechanism design.