Automation and Polarization

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Acemoglu, Daron; Loebbing, Jonas
• 署名单位: Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); University of Munich
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-3808
• DOI: 10.1086/739330
• 发表日期: 2026
• 关键词: comparative advantage; GROWTH; skills; income; aggregation; TECHNOLOGY; assignment; INEQUALITY; machines; IMPACT

摘要

We develop an assignment model of automation. Each of a continuum of tasks of variable complexity is assigned to either capital or one of a continuum of labor skills. We characterize conditions for interior automation, whereby tasks of intermediate complexity are performed by capital. Interior automation arises when low-skill wages are low and effective cost of capital in low-complexity tasks is high. Minimum wages make interior automation less likely. Higher capital productivity causes employment and wage polarization, changes the skill premium nonmonotonically, and reduces the real wage of workers with comparative advantage profiles close to that of capital.