Rent Guarantee Insurance

• 成果类型: Article; Early Access
• 署名作者: Abramson, Boaz; Van Nieuwerburgh, Stijn
• 署名单位: Columbia University; Center for Economic & Policy Research (CEPR)
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-3808
• DOI: 10.1086/742422
• 发表日期: 2026
• 关键词: quantitative theory; neighborhood; credit; MARKET; RISK; foreclosure; INEQUALITY; medicaid; Eviction

摘要

Rent guarantee insurance (RGI) provides tenants with insurance against nonpayment of rent. We introduce RGI in a quantitative equilibrium model of housing insecurity and show it increases welfare by improving risk sharing across idiosyncratic and aggregate states, reducing the need for large security deposits and reducing homelessness that imposes large costs on society. While unrestricted access to RGI is not financially viable because of moral hazard and adverse selection, restricting access can restore viability. Private insurers target better-off renters, while public insurers focus on households most at risk of homelessness. Stronger tenant protections increase the effectiveness of RGI.