A Model of Social Duties

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Ellingsen, Tore; Mohlin, Erik
• 署名单位: Stockholm School of Economics; Lund University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-3808
• DOI: 10.1086/739834
• 发表日期: 2026
• 关键词: cognitive-dissonance; impure altruism; preferences; JUSTICE; NORMS; incentives; ECONOMICS; pressure; PROPERTY; DYNAMICS

摘要

We develop and test a model of social duties. The model distinguishes unconditional duties to take or avoid certain actions from conditional duties that depend on the actions' payoffs. It also distinguishes strict duties (must do) from liberal duties (ought to do). The disutility associated with duty violation depends on the duty's strictness and is proportional to the externality the violation causes. The model rationalizes behavioral patterns that are incompatible with consequentialist preferences. Our tests comprise parameter estimation based on subjects' behavior across different situations as well as measurement of duties through spectators' appropriateness ratings.