On the optimality of deferred public annuities
成果类型:
Article
署名作者:
Einav, Liran; Finkelstein, Amy
署名单位:
Stanford University; National Bureau of Economic Research; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); National Bureau of Economic Research
刊物名称:
JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS
ISSN/ISSBN:
0047-2727
DOI:
10.1016/j.jpubeco.2026.105601
发表日期:
2026
关键词:
social-security
摘要:
What is the optimal path of Social Security benefits for an individual who has retired with a stock of wealth, faces stochastic mortality, and has no access to annuities and no preferences for bequests? It is a deferred annuity in which the government annuity pays out zero for some periods and a constant amount after that. The optimal length of the deferral period increases with the retiree's initial wealth and their survival probability.