Specialization in Banking

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Blickle, Kristian; Parlatore, Cecilia; Saunders, Anthony
• 署名单位: Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - New York; Center for Economic & Policy Research (CEPR); New York University; National Bureau of Economic Research; New York University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF FINANCE
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-1082; 1540-6261
• DOI: 10.1111/jofi.70032
• 发表日期: 2026-06
• 页码: 1531-1572
• 关键词: financial structure; INFORMATION; COMPETITION; MARKET; credit; propagation; distance

摘要

Using supervisory data on the loan portfolios of large U.S. banks, we document that these banks specialize by concentrating their lending disproportionately in a few industries. This specialization is consistent with banks having industry-specific knowledge, reflected in reduced risk of loan defaults, lower aggregate charge-offs, and higher propensity to lend to opaque firms in the preferred industry. Banks attract high-quality borrowers by offering generous loan terms in their specialized industry, especially to borrowers with alternative options. Banks focus on their preferred industry in times of instability and relatively lower Tier 1 capital as well as after surges in deposits.