Leader-Follower Dynamics in Shareholder Activism

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Cetemen, Doruk; Cisternas, Gonzalo; Kolb, Aaron; Viswanathan, S.
• 署名单位: Luiss Guido Carli University; Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - New York; Indiana University System; IU Kelley School of Business; Indiana University Bloomington; Duke University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF FINANCE
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-1082; 1540-6261
• DOI: 10.1111/jofi.70033
• 发表日期: 2026-06
• 关键词: HEDGE FUND ACTIVISM; speculation; governance; OWNERSHIP; liquidity

摘要

We propose a theory of coordination and influence among blockholders. Privately informed activists time their trades in sequence to lower acquisition costs, prompting a strategic use of order flows: leader activists create trading gains for their followers, ultimately influencing their willingness to bear greater value-enhancing intervention costs. Through this channel, informed trades can exhibit predictability, in sharp contrast with Kyle (1985, Econometrica 53, 1315-1335). We explain how this novel predictability shapes free-rider problems affecting governance, and how it produces price abnormalities analogous to those documented empirically. We also uncover how private information interdependence can be a key catalyst for the mechanism studied.