Aid Fragmentation and Corruption

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Child, Travers B.; Wright, Austin L.; Xiao, Yun
• 署名单位: Sungkyunkwan University (SKKU); China Europe International Business School; University of Chicago; University of Gothenburg
• 刊物名称: REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0034-6535
• DOI: 10.1162/rest_a_01458
• 发表日期: 2026
• 关键词: foreign-aid; QUALITY; governance; DEMOCRACY

摘要

Aid fragmentation-the simultaneous operation of multiple development agencies in one setting-has long raised concerns about coordination challenges and opportunities for corruption. Leveraging unique data on project delivery in Afghanistan, we present the first microlevel empirical analysis of aid fragmentation. We find that aid delivered by a single donor can significantly reduce corruption. Projects delivered under conditions of aid fragmentation, by contrast, can facilitate corruption. We find evidence for a theoretical mechanism linking infrastructure and physical goods with waste and leakage. Our results clarify the policy losses tied to fragmentation, yielding insights for combating misappropriation of aid.