Monopsony and the Wage Effects of Migration

成果类型:
Article
署名作者:
Amior, Michael; Manning, Alan
署名单位:
Hebrew University of Jerusalem; University of London; London School Economics & Political Science
刊物名称:
ECONOMIC JOURNAL
ISSN/ISSBN:
0013-0133
DOI:
10.1093/ej/ueaf053
发表日期:
2026
关键词:
labor-markets evidence educational-attainment firm heterogeneity legal status immigration IMPACT equilibrium elasticities RECRUITMENT mobility
摘要:
If labour markets are competitive, migration can only affect native wages via marginal products. But under imperfect competition, migration may also increase wage mark-downs-if firms have greater monopsony power over migrants than natives, but cannot perfectly wage discriminate. While marginal products depend on relative labour supplies across skill cells, mark-downs depend on migrant concentration within them. This insight can help rationalise empirical violations of canonical migration models. Using US data, we conclude that migration does increase mark-downs: this expands aggregate native income, but redistributes it from workers to firms. Policies which constrain monopsony power over migrants can mitigate these adverse wage effects.