Bad governance: How privatization increases corruption in the developing world

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Reinsberg, Bernhard; Stubbs, Thomas; Kentikelenis, Alexander; King, Lawrence
• 署名单位: University of Cambridge; University of Glasgow; University of London; Royal Holloway University London; Bocconi University; University of Massachusetts System; University of Massachusetts Amherst
• 刊物名称: REGULATION & GOVERNANCE
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1748-5983
• DOI: 10.1111/rego.12265
• 发表日期: 2020
• 页码: 698-717
• 关键词: International Monetary Fund; political-economy; responsive regulation; imf conditionality; grand corruption; state capacity; policy change; GOVERNMENT; REFORM; GROWTH

摘要

International organizations have become key actors in the fight against corruption. Among these organizations, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) maintains a powerful position over borrowing countries in its ability to mandate far-ranging policy reforms - so-called conditionalities - in exchange for access to financial assistance. While IMF pressure can force the implementation of anti-corruption policies, potentially reducing corruption, other IMF policy measures, such as the privatization of state-owned enterprises, can create rent-extraction opportunities and limit the capacity of state institutions to limit corrupt behavior. To test these mechanisms, we conduct instrumental-variable regression analysis using an original dataset on IMF conditionality for up to 141 developing countries from 1982 to 2014. We find that conditions to privatize state-owned enterprises exert significant detrimental effects on corruption control. Conversely, other areas of IMF intervention are not consistently related to corruption abatement. These findings offer policy lessons regarding the design of conditionality, which should avoid large-scale privatization, especially under conditions of weak accountability.