Patrons against clients: Electoral uncertainty and bureaucratic tenure in politicized states

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Schuster, Christian
• 署名单位: University of London; University College London
• 刊物名称: REGULATION & GOVERNANCE
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1748-5983
• DOI: 10.1111/rego.12186
• 发表日期: 2020
• 页码: 26-43
• 关键词: CIVIL-SERVICE; REFORM; merit; COMPETITION; ELECTIONS; TRANSPARENCY; institutions; adoption; ECONOMY; POWER

摘要

Why would incumbents undertake institutional reforms that constrain their discretion over state resources? Many studies point to electoral competition in response. They argue that incumbents who risk exit from office undertake reform to insure themselves against potentially hostile successors. This paper challenges this line of reasoning, arguing that it confounds two potential implications of electoral competition - potential and certain electoral losses - which yield contrary reform incentives. Certain exits from office may well incentivize reforms as insurance. Where elections are contested, however, incumbents face incentives to resist reforms that constrain discretion over state resources that provide incumbents with electoral advantage. This argument is developed and assessed with an institutional reform the literature has so far neglected: job stability protections (tenure) in politicized bureaucracies. A case analysis of the Dominican Republic and suggestive cross-country data confirm theoretical predictions: electoral uncertainty dis-incentivizes tenure reform. Electoral competition may thus be a double-edged sword for institutional reform.