Does regulating remuneration affect the market value of European Union banks? Large versus small/medium sized banks

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Diaz Diaz, Belen; Garcia-Ramos, Rebeca; Garcia Olalla, Myriam
• 署名单位: Universidad de Cantabria
• 刊物名称: REGULATION & GOVERNANCE
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1748-5983
• DOI: 10.1111/rego.12175
• 发表日期: 2020
• 页码: 150-164
• 关键词: sarbanes-oxley act; corporate governance; executive-compensation; economic consequences; stock returns; Firm value; event; performance; IMPACT; POLICY

摘要

The aim of this paper was to analyze equity market reactions to the mandatory European Union regulation of remuneration policies in financial institutions. Using event study methodology, we investigated market reactions to the first European Directive on compensation policies after the financial crisis using a sample of 124 banks operating in the European Union. We divided the sample into two groups according to bank size considering four criteria: the US Dodd-Frank Act 2010, the Liikanen Report 2012, Global Systemically Important Banks 2011, and the European Central Bank 2014. We found strong evidence of an average negative market reaction to compensation regulation. Moreover, this negative reaction is stronger for large banks than for small/medium sized banks.