The regulatory state in developing countries: Redistribution and regulatory failure in Brazil

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Donadelli, Flavia; van der Heijden, Jeroen
• 署名单位: Victoria University Wellington
• 刊物名称: REGULATION & GOVERNANCE
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1748-5983
• DOI: 10.1111/rego.12459
• 发表日期: 2024
• 页码: 348-370
• 关键词: QUALITATIVE COMPARATIVE-ANALYSIS; institutional foundations; DELEGATION; privatization; INDEPENDENCE; agencies

摘要

Following the traditional doctrine of the regulatory state, regulatory agencies should be given very focused mandates and stay away from the politicized realm of distributive policies and decisions. An opposing perspective would state that if regulatory agencies can contribute to economic redistribution, positive results such as network expansion, economies of scale, and fiscal efficiency will ultimately lead to lower levels of regulatory failure. This article tests whether, in countries of high socio-economic inequality, such as Brazil, the active incorporation of distributive considerations by regulatory agencies leads to lower levels of failure. Through the analysis of the activities of seven Brazilian network regulatory agencies, the article develops theory-driven expectations and tests these expectations using crisp set Qualitative Comparative Analysis (csQCA). It concludes that not prioritizing redistribution is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for regulatory agencies' failure. In most types of failure, a lack of priority to redistribution leads to failure when combined with low regulatory capacity and low levels of competence.