Separate, Unequal, and Ignored? Interjurisdictional Competition and the Budgetary Choices of Poor and Affluent Municipalities

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Jimenez, Benedict S.
• 署名单位: Northeastern University
• 刊物名称: PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0033-3352
• DOI: 10.1111/puar.12186
• 发表日期: 2014
• 页码: 246-257
• 关键词: social-stratification; governmental inequality; metropolitan-areas; local-government; Tiebout; FRAGMENTATION; Regionalism

摘要

The fundamental value underlying the design of a fragmented system of local governance is consumer sovereignty. This system functions as a market-like arrangement providing citizen-consumers a choice of jurisdictions that off er different bundles of public services and taxes. However, the same choice also can facilitate class-based population sorting, creating regions where fiscally wealthy jurisdictions coexist with impoverished ones. Some argue that the public market enhances the power of all consumers, whether poor or rich. Even if the poor are concentrated in some jurisdictions, they can exercise their voice to ensure that their government responds to their service needs. But does the voice of the poor matter as much as the voice of the rich in determining service levels in the local public market? Comparing the budgetary choices in poor and affluent municipalities, this article shows that in highly fragmented regions, some municipal services are provided the least in communities where they are needed the most.