Does Disclosure of Performance Information Influence Street-level Bureaucrats' Enforcement Style?

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: de Boer, Noortje; Eshuis, Jasper; Klijn, Erik-Hans
• 署名单位: Erasmus University Rotterdam; Erasmus University Rotterdam - Excl Erasmus MC
• 刊物名称: PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0033-3352
• DOI: 10.1111/puar.12926
• 发表日期: 2018
• 页码: 694-704
• 关键词: common source bias; ORGANIZATIONAL RESEARCH; Regulatory enforcement; TRANSPARENCY; trust; inspectors; GOVERNMENT

摘要

Governments use different regulatory instruments to ensure that businesses owners or inspectees comply with rules and regulations. One tool that is increasingly applied is disclosing inspectees' performance information to other stakeholders. Disclosing performance information has consequences for street-level bureaucrats because it increases the visibility of their day-to-day work. Using a survey (n = 507) among Dutch inspectors of the Netherlands Food and Consumer Product Safety Authority, this article shows that the disclosure of performance information has an impact on enforcement style at the street level. Findings show that perceived disclosed performance information positively enhances all three dimensions of street-level bureaucrats' enforcement style (legal, facilitation, and accommodation). This effect is strongest for facilitation and accommodation and weakest for the legal style. Perceived resistance by inspectees partly explains this effect. Contrary to expectations, more perceived disclosure does not result in more but in less perceived resistance of inspectees by street-level bureaucrats.