Politics of Disclosure: Organizational Transparency as Multiactor Negotiation

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Heimstaedt, Maximilian; Dobusch, Leonhard
• 署名单位: University of Innsbruck
• 刊物名称: PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0033-3352
• DOI: 10.1111/puar.12895
• 发表日期: 2018
• 页码: 727-738
• 关键词: open government; INSTITUTIONAL WORK; KNOWLEDGE; DYNAMICS; BEHAVIOR; barriers; adoption; access; truth; field

摘要

Transparency is in vogue, yet it is often used as an umbrella concept for a wide array of phenomena. More focused concepts are needed to understand the form and function of different phenomena of visibility. In this article, the authors define organizational transparency as systematic disclosure programs that meet the information needs of other actors. Organizational transparency, they argue, is best studied as an interorganizational negotiation process on the field level. To evaluate its merit, the authors apply this framework to a case study on the introduction of open data in the Berlin city administration. Analyzing the politics of disclosure, they consider the similarities and differences between phenomena of visibility (e.g., open data, freedom of information), explore the transformative power of negotiating transparency, and deduce recommendations for managing transparency.