Prospect Theory Goes Public: Experimental Evidence on Cognitive Biases in Public Policy and Management Decisions

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Belle, Nicola; Cantarelli, Paola; Belardinelli, Paolo
• 署名单位: Scuola Superiore Sant'Anna; Bocconi University; Bocconi University
• 刊物名称: PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0033-3352
• DOI: 10.1111/puar.12960
• 发表日期: 2018
• 页码: 828-840
• 关键词: performance information; asymmetric dominance; selection; CHOICE; RISK; rationality; politicians; preferences; heuristics; VIOLATIONS

摘要

This article tests a broad range of cognitive biases branching out from prospect theory in the context of public policy and management. Results illuminate systematic deviations from rationality. In experiments 1 through 5, the framing of outcomes influenced decisions across policy and management domains. In experiment 6, public employees were prone to an anchoring bias when setting standards for responsiveness. Experiment 7 shows that public workers tend to put more effort into activities that affect higher percentages of beneficiaries, even if the absolute number of affected clients is constant. Experiments 8 and 9 suggest that public employees are more likely to stick to a suboptimal status quo as the number of superior alternatives increases. Experiment 10 provides evidence of an asymmetric dominance effect: decisions changed when a decoy was present. This article contributes to behavioral public administration by replicating and extending previous trials.