Corruption as Resource Transfer: An Interdisciplinary Synthesis

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Jancsics, David
• 署名单位: California State University System; San Diego State University
• 刊物名称: PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0033-3352
• DOI: 10.1111/puar.13024
• 发表日期: 2019
• 页码: 523-537
• 关键词: ETHICAL DECISION-MAKING; state capture; organizational corruption; matter; ENFORCEMENT; RECIPROCITY; TRANSITION; networks; POLITICS; models

摘要

Despite significant investment in anticorruption instruments in the past decades, confusion about their effectiveness remains. While a growing body of scholarship claims that anticorruption reforms have generally failed, other scholars have shown that particular anticorruption tools may actually work. A likely explanation for these puzzling outcomes is that public administration research holds a mistaken view of corruption, and improperly selected anticorruption strategies often target the wrong type of corruption. To overcome this problem, this article proposes a four-cell typology of corruption, reflecting two critical dimensions along which most corrupt behaviors occur: the resource transfer and the primary beneficiary. Synthesizing recent research developments, this article introduces a new conceptualization of corruption that integrates perspectives from several disciplines. It also offers a series of propositions concerning how each corruption type could be fought. The article concludes with implications for research and practice.