Taxation by Citation? Exploring Local Governments' Revenue Motive for Traffic Fines

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Su, Min
• 署名单位: Louisiana State University System; Louisiana State University
• 刊物名称: PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0033-3352
• DOI: 10.1111/puar.13125
• 发表日期: 2020
• 页码: 36-45
• 关键词: tax; accidents; tickets; CHOICE; police

摘要

Anecdotal evidence suggests that local governments may have a revenue motive for traffic fines, beyond public safety concerns. Using California's county-level data over a 12-year period, this article shows that counties increased per capita traffic fines by 40 to 42 cents immediately after a 10 percentage point tax revenue loss in the previous year; however, these counties did not reduce traffic fines if they experienced a tax revenue increase in the previous year. This finding indicates that county governments probably view traffic fines as a revenue source to offset tax revenue loss, but not as a revenue stabilizer to manage revenue fluctuation. This article also finds that low-income and Hispanic-majority counties raised more traffic fines. Counties that generated more revenue from the hotel tax-a tax typically paid by travelers and visitors-raised more traffic fines, indicating a possible tax-exporting behavior by shifting the traffic fine burden to nonlocal drivers.