Tools of Control? Comparing Congressional and Presidential Performance Management Reforms

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Kroll, Alexander; Moynihan, Donald P.
• 署名单位: State University System of Florida; Florida International University; Georgetown University
• 刊物名称: PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0033-3352
• DOI: 10.1111/puar.13312
• 发表日期: 2021
• 页码: 599-609
• 关键词: POLITICAL-IDEOLOGY; Divided government; work; part

摘要

Presidents are claimed to have a stronger interest in an effective bureaucracy than Congress because they must be responsive to the public as a whole rather than narrow interests. We examine this claim in the context of multiple waves of U.S. performance management reforms: the Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA) of 1993, the Program Assessment Rating Tool (PART ) (2002-2008), and the GPRA Modernization Act (GPRAMA) of 2010. Using four waves of federal employee surveys spanning 17 years, we measure reform success as employees' purposeful use of performance data as a result of being exposed to routines embedded in the reforms. We find that the legislative-led GPRAMA is associated with more purposeful data use on aggregate while the PART executive reform succumbed to a partisan pattern of implementation. Statutory reforms are less likely to be experienced as ideological tools than executive branch reforms used by the president to impose control over agencies.