The Retraction of Policy Benefits across US Federal Agencies: Programmatic Cutbacks and Executive Control of US Federal Grant Retrenchments

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Krause, George A.; Zarit, Matthew
• 署名单位: University System of Georgia; University of Georgia; Pennsylvania State System of Higher Education (PASSHE); Slippery Rock University - Pennsylvania; Pennsylvania State System of Higher Education (PASSHE); Slippery Rock University - Pennsylvania
• 刊物名称: PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0033-3352
• DOI: 10.1111/puar.13310
• 发表日期: 2022
• 页码: 682-691
• 关键词: management; decline; budget

摘要

This study analyzes an important and overlooked aspect of cutback budgeting affecting US federal agencies - reductions to existing US federal grant awards. Because presidents face incentives for both executive accountability and effective administration, we predict that public agencies which are more responsive to presidential goals, as well as those led by more capable agency heads, shall experience less severe grant retrenchments. Statistical analysis of approximately 745,000 grant retrenchments for the 1988-2008 period reveals that the distribution of these programmatic cutbacks is consistent with enhancing executive accountability, while also favoring policy effectiveness. Agencies led by chief executives with considerable managerial-specific expertise are associated with only increased reductions in grant retrenchments for small programmatic cuts to existing grants. These findings illustrate how presidents' strategy of executive administration seeks to limit programmatic cutbacks for more responsive federal agencies, and also for public organizations whose leaders exhibit higher levels of policy-specific expertise.