When do bureaucrats respond to external demands? A theoretical framework and empirical test of bureaucratic responsiveness

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Rimkute, Dovile; van der Voet, Joris
• 署名单位: Leiden University; Leiden University - Excl LUMC
• 刊物名称: PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0033-3352
• DOI: 10.1111/puar.13749
• 发表日期: 2024
• 页码: 1095-1116
• 关键词: POLITICAL CONTROL; ORGANIZATIONAL REPUTATION; choice experiments; politicization; agenda; DESIGN

摘要

Bureaucrats must balance neutral competence with responsiveness to external demands. As external demands are simultaneous and multidimensional, this study analyzes bureaucratic responsiveness according to bureaucratic actors' prioritization decisions. Using a discrete choice experiment followed by qualitative interviews in the context of EU agencies, we investigate to what extent bureaucratic responsiveness depends upon the stakeholder that expresses an external demand (source), the aspect of bureaucratic conduct that is addressed (content), and the presence of adverse media attention (salience). In addition to corroborating prior empirical findings, we provide a novel understanding of bureaucratic responsiveness by showing the way demands' source and content affect responsiveness jointly. Across the range of technical, performative, legal-procedural, and moral demands, we identify which stakeholders can impose demands most authoritatively. We also extend previous research by demonstrating that adverse media attention strengthens responsiveness to technical and moral demands, but not to performative and legal-procedural demands.