Equity in government contracting: Analyzing the performance of small disadvantaged businesses

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Brunjes, Benjamin M.; Rodriguez-Plesa, Evelyn
• 署名单位: University of Washington; University of Washington Seattle; University of North Carolina; North Carolina Central University; University of Washington; University of Washington Seattle
• 刊物名称: PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0033-3352
• DOI: 10.1111/puar.13704
• 发表日期: 2024
• 页码: 484-499
• 关键词: competition; service; cost; uncertainty; incentives; DESIGN; MARKET

摘要

Set aside programs, which preference disadvantaged businesses, have long been among the largest government equity programs in the United States. Set asides ensure government revenues spur economic growth in firms and communities that have traditionally lacked representation in systems of power. However, there has been skepticism about whether set aside programs are compatible with the efficiency objectives of government contracting. Few empirical studies have assessed the comparative performance of small, disadvantaged businesses and other firms to determine if there are differences. Using contract level data from the Federal Procurement Data System: Next Generation, we test whether set aside contracts are associated with a reduction in the government's ability to secure best value. We find few performance differences between small, disadvantaged businesses, and other vendors across a range of goods and services, suggesting mutual benefits and no outsized risks when governments engage in contracts with disadvantaged firms.