Testing the effects of merit appointments and bureaucratic autonomy on governmental performance: Evidence from African bureaucracies

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Fernandez, Sergio; Cheema, Faisal
• 署名单位: Indiana University System; Indiana University Bloomington; University of Pretoria
• 刊物名称: PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0033-3352
• DOI: 10.1111/puar.13896
• 发表日期: 2025
• 页码: 1460-1475
• 关键词: civil-service systems; state; CHALLENGES; CORRUPTION; capacity; REFORM

摘要

Appointing bureaucrats based on merit and protecting them from excessive political interference have become bedrocks of modern bureaucracy. Populist leaders throughout the world, however, are looking to undermine merit systems and politicize bureaucracies. This study analyzes the impact of merit-based appointments and bureaucratic autonomy on service delivery effectiveness, using longitudinal data from a panel of African countries. Throughout Africa, social, economic, and political conditions have made it difficult for meritocratic and autonomous bureaucracies to take root and flourish as they have elsewhere. Despite these challenges, the study's main finding is that the practice of appointing bureaucrats based on merit has a positive effect on the provision of public services like transportation infrastructure, standardized education, drinking water, sanitation, and waste disposal. Political leaders undercutting meritocratic civil services and expanding patronage appointments do so at their own peril due to the adverse consequences of their actions on governmental performance. Little evidence is found of a relationship between bureaucratic autonomy and service delivery effectiveness.