Regulatory offsetting in advanced democracies

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Steinebach, Yves; Hinterleitner, Markus; Fernandez-i-Marin, Xavier
• 署名单位: University of Oslo; University of Lausanne; University of Barcelona
• 刊物名称: PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0033-3352
• DOI: 10.1111/puar.13887
• 发表日期: 2025
• 页码: 1398-1411
• 关键词: policy diffusion; austerity; POLITICS

摘要

The growth of rules in modern democracies burdens citizens, businesses, and administrative bodies. To address this, many governments have implemented so-called regulatory offsetting schemes, requiring the removal of existing rules and regulations for each new one introduced. However, systematic knowledge on which countries have adopted these schemes and their specific designs remains lacking. Our study maps regulatory offsetting initiatives across OECD states and offers a first theoretical framework for understanding government adoption. While political and ideational factors influence the adoption of offsetting schemes, they do not explain their specific design. Offsetting schemes thus reflect the political tensions between advocates for an activist state and supporters of a more restrained government, with design being of secondary importance. These findings enhance our understanding of how governments and public administrations manage rule growth.