Executive policymaking influence via the administrative apparatus

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Yackee, Susan Webb
• 署名单位: University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison
• 刊物名称: PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0033-3352
• DOI: 10.1111/puar.13899
• 发表日期: 2025
• 页码: 1445-1459
• 关键词: presidency; responsiveness; bureaucracy; rulemaking; DISCRETION; ORDERS

摘要

Elected chief executives in the United States-that is, governors and presidents-routinely attempt to achieve their domestic policy goals by influencing the decision-making of public agencies. I provide empirical assessments of the two most frequently theorized elected executive influence tactics: political appointments and the centralization of agency decision-making. Using an expansive survey of the leaders in over 1800 state agencies, observational and experimental evidence are used to evaluate the effectiveness of these tactics. I find that state agency leaders believe that the appointment of officials to key agency posts allows the governor to better achieve his or her policy objectives than centralizing decision-making, and Republican governors are seen as more successful in using these tactics than Democratic ones. Overall, the results provide a real-world sense of how one government institution-the elected chief executive-tries to steer the policymaking of public managers and the government agencies that they lead.