Fiscal easing in local governments facing potential merger: Visible in budgets or hidden in overruns?
成果类型:
Article
署名作者:
Askim, Jostein; Houlberg, Kurt; Klausen, Jan Erling
署名单位:
University of Oslo
刊物名称:
PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION
ISSN/ISSBN:
0033-3298
DOI:
10.1111/padm.12781
发表日期:
2022
页码:
999-1018
关键词:
municipal amalgamations
size
BEHAVIOR
摘要:
Mergers incentivize local governments to ease their fiscal policies before the merger is implemented. This incentive is powerful: it is known that local governments start easing fiscal policies even before they know for sure that a merger will occur and even if merging is what they want. Based on a study of Norwegian municipalities, this article shows that irrespective of whether local governments face certain or potential mergers, their fiscal easing is manifested primarily in budget overruns rather than candidly documented in budgets. Among local governments facing a potential merger, unwilling governments ease their fiscal policies more than willing ones do and to a larger extent apply a concealment strategy.